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ONE YEAR REVIEW OF
APPEALS AND AGENCY
BY MAURICE REULER,

Of the Denver Bar

During the year last preceding there have been a great many
cases covering the subject of appellate procedure which have been
decided by our Supreme Court, but only two cases covering the
field of agency. Therefore, this article will be devoted primarily
to a consideration of the problems faced by the practitioner when
he gets ready to appeal a case to the Supreme Court of Colorado.
In general, the author will use the term "appeal" and "Writ of
Error" interchangeably unless otherwise noted.
Turning first to the matter of appellate procedure one is reminded of the admonition given by a law school professor to his
class in civil procedure. Namely, that clients do not, as a rule,
come to lawyers' offices in order to find out what they should do,
they come to lawyers' offices in order to find out how to do it.
The matter of procedure is clearly the "how" of the practice of
law. To paraphrase the old saying, "while procedure may not make
the case, it clearly helps it."
The writer has divided this subject into seven separate headings as a matter of convenience in classification. The first heading
which we will cover is that of Judgments.
Surely there is not a lawyer in the State of Colorado who does
not know that the primary object of a lawsuit is to secure a judgment, and that if the judgment is secured he may then perhaps,
execute on same. It would follow, therefore, that if judgment is
secured in the Trial Court, the next end to attain is to see that
that judgment is sustained in the Supreme Court. In order to
do this it necessary that a proper record on appeal be prepared.
Our Court, in the case of Ruth King and Joe King vs. Frank Williams,' ruled that the length of time within which a defeated litigant
may secure a Writ of Error in the Supreme Court is three months2 .
Here it appeared that on August 6th, 1954, verdict was had
for the defendant. On the 24th day of September the Trial Court
denied motions for a new trial and entry of judgment notwithstanding the verdict. At that time, the Trial Judge requested the winning
attorney to prepare a formal order of judgment. The formal order
was not filed in the District Court until the 11th day of October.
On the 8th od December counsel for the defeated litigant filed a
motion to extend the time within which to prepare the transcript.
The motion was granted and on the 11th of January a praecipe was
was issued. It should be noted that the praecipe was filed exactly
three months from the date of the entry of the final order of
judgment in the Trial Court.
Mr. Justice Clark sustaining a motion to dismiss, ruled "that
IC.B.A.
'Colo.

Ad. Sh. Vol. 7, No. 8, Pg. 271,
Rules C.P. 111(b).
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the sole question here is at what date did the judgment become
effective and final. A judgment is binding and effective from the
time of its pronouncement, although not actually entered into the
record until later." (Page 272) Mr. Justice Clark emphatically
states that it is the statement of the Court that judgment is entered
that constitutes the judgment and that it is from that day that
time will run.
The entry of judgment is ministerial and unless a Writ of
Error is taken out within 90 days from the date of pronouncement of judgment, Writ of Error will not lie. This case illustrates
the point that counsel cannot be too careful in computing the
time within which he must perfect a Writ of Error to the Supreme
Court.
In another interesting decision Byrdie W. Johnson vs. Harry A.
Johnson,3 the following occured: In what appeared to be a tort action, complaint was filed on March 22, 1949. Answer thereto was
filed November 30, 1951. On January 15, 1954 the defendant filed a
motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to prosecute, "pointing
out" that four terms of court have passed since the matter had
been at issue; that said matter has been at issue for more than
two years without any diligent prosecution by any of the plain-
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tiffs or their attorneys (Page 491). The Court heard this motion,
and on the 22nd day of January, 1954, found, "that defendant's
motion is well taken," and ordered, "that it be and is hereby granted and the case is hereby dismissed." The Court then gave sixty
days in which to file a Bill of Exceptions and tender a trascript.
On the 5th day of March of the same year, the plaintiff filed
a motion for vacation of the judgment of dismissal, and on March
8th the Trial Court entered said motion by way of order granting same. On the 29th day of March the Trial Court reconsidered
the defendant's original motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute
and on that day it entered inter alia the following findings: "It
is hereby ordered, adjudged and decreed that the motion be
sustained and that the complaint of the plaintiff filed herein be
dismissed."
The plaintiff had had several different counsel, and on June
18th new counsel filed a motion for "Relief From Judgment" relying on provisions of Rule 60(b) (1) (2). On the 7th of September,
1954, the Trial Court again entered extensive findings followed by
a document entitled "Judgment." In said document the Court stated
"It is therefore ordered, adjudged and decreed by the Court that
the motion for relief from judgment filed by Byrdie W. Johnson
and heard September 7, 1954, be denied." Thereafter, counsel for
the plaintiff, on the 6th of December, approximately 89 days sub-
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sequent to the entry of the order of September 7th, filed praecipe
for Writ of Error.
Our Court, in ruling on the question under a motion to dismiss stated "the question presented on this issue is when was a
final judgment entered by the Trial Court

. .

. the final determina-

tion of the cause is a judgment whether the relief granted is legal
or equitable."4 "Any action by which a Trial Court terminates
the proceeding is a final judgment .

.

. now the Court considers

what was the action of this Trial Court that terminated the case.
Was it the document entitled "Judgment," or was it the entry and
pronouncement of its order of March 29th, dismissing the case
under the defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute.
The Court notes that the so-called judgment of September 7th
goes merely to the question as to whether plaintiff was entitled
to relief from the judgment theretofore entered." The Court states,
"it has been held that the character of an instrument, whether a
judgment or an order, is to determine by its contents and substance and not by its title" (Page 492).
The Court then notes that it is unfortunate that counsel was
misled by this document, but that under Rule 60(b), "that a motion under this subdivision does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation . . . such motion in any event is

directed to the discretion of the Trial Court, and when one files
such a motion he admits for all practical purposes that the judgment is in all respects regular on the face of the record, but asserts that the record would show differently except for mistake,
inadvertence or excusable neglect on behalf of counsel or client.
No such showing was here presented. If it be that probable error
appears in the record, then, of course, proper procedure indicates
a review upon writ of error procured within the prescribed period
of time following the entry of final judgment" (Page 493).
In the instant case a most difficult problem seems to be presented, for here we have a situation in which after judgment of
dismissal is entered counsel for the defeated litigant seeks review
of same by an appropriate motion under Rule 60(b). In the interim, the time in which counsel would have to take a writ of
4 49 C.J.S, Pg. 26.
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error under Rule 1ll(b), from the decision of the Trial Court
granting the motion to dismiss, is running, so that within 90 days
from the date of the granting of the motion, the right to appeal to
the Supreme Court by Writ of Error is gone. In the instant case, indeed, the right to appeal to the Supreme Court under the ruling
of the Court herein, had lapsed prior to the ruling of the Trial
Judge on the motion to set aside its previous judgment of dismissal. The Court, through Mr. Justice Clark points out that the
proper procedure is to file an independent action in the Trial
Court. In the interim, taking the case, to the Supreme Court.
This, of course, would appear to be proper procedure, but the
writer wishes to point out that where counsel finds himself in a
position in which he believes a motion under Rule 60 should
be filed, and particularly 60(b) thereof, that he should certainly
do one of two things: Request the Trial Court to determine the
matter speedily in order that the 90 day period within which to
docket in the Supreme Court will not elaose prior to the determination by the Trial Court under Rule 60(b), or (2) he should file
an independent action.
The writer would also note that there appears to be a hiatus
in the rules under this problem in this respect. Suppose that a
motion under Rule 60(b) to set aside a judgment is filed in apt
time; suppose also that counsel, heeding the instant case, dockets
within 90 days the case in -the Supreme Court; suppose that subsequent to the docketing of the case in the Supreme Court the
Trial Court determines that its previous judgment was in error,
and reverses same. The question then arises, what is counsel to
do? Has the Trial Court continued jurisdiction after the docketing of the case in the Supreme Court? And, if so, may the counsel
substiute th new judgment of the Trial Court for the judgment
of the Trial Court theretofore entered in the matter docketed in
the Supreme Court? To the writer, at least, the rules are not
clear, unless the phrase in 112(a) governs as to filing of a supplemental record.
Having considered the cases cited during the past year, within
which the question has arisen as to the date from which the time
for Writ of Error runs, we come now to the next important conLunch With
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sideration, and that is the state of the record itself. There have
been two decisions concerning a matter which appears to have
given lawyers difficulty and that is: What must be in the record
insofar as the question of a final judgment is concerned? Our
Court has held that the final judgment, as such. must he a Da-t
of the record. In the case of W. B. Sutley vs. Glenn C. Davis and
Roy S. Lofton,5 the following occurred: This was a condemnation
proceeding in which commissioners were appointed. The commissioners found that there was no necessity for the condrnrtinn,
and the counsel for the plaintiff moved to set aside the findings.
The Trial Court, on the 12th day of September, denied the motion and declared that a rehearing was dispensed with. Within
the proper time counsel for the plaintiff tendered and had the
record and the reporter's transcript of the evidence before the commissioners approved by the judge. Nothing further was in the record. Our Court citing Rule 112 (a) states: The record shall contain. "the material Dleadinos without unne-essary clirlicatinn Ohe
verdict, or the findings of fact and conslusions of law, together
with directions for the entry of judoment thereon. The master's
report, if any. The opinion, if any. The judgment or part thereof
to be reviewed and the designation or stipulation of the parties
as to the matters to be included in the record." The Court pointed
out that no judgment appeared in this case; that therefore. clismissal followed. The writer cannot uree too strongly upon his
brethren the need for careful study of the rules pertaining to appellate practice in order that the pitfall herein illustrated and
others like it may be avoided.
Again, in the decision of Edward L. French and Dorothy
Frenh vs. Art L. Haarhnes andi Rov N. Jones,6 the Court ninted
out that a designation for a direction for entry of judgment but
no designation for any final judgment as shown on the designation of record in error is a fatal defect and the Court again cites
Rule 112, stating that the judgment itself must appear as part of
the record; that to designate the entry of judgment is not sufficient, since that is merely a ministerial duty devolving upon the
5
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clerk of the Trial Court after the judgment itself has been entered.
The writer would suggest that in every case in which counsel
feels that there is the slightest chance that the matter will be
appealed to the Supreme Court, counsel should prepare findings
of fact, conclusions of law and a judgment. If such is done, the
question presented in the instant case and in the previous cases
cannot arise.
An interesting matter that has come up to our Court within
the past year has involved the proper parties to an appeal; that
is. who may take a writ of error to the Supreme Couirt? In the7
first of these cases, Mayme Schoenewald vs. Louis Shoen, et al,
we had the following situation: A complaint for damages in which
a third party complaint was filed. Third party defendants then
proceded by motion to dismiss and the Trial Court entered an order
dismissing without prejudice, the third party complaint. Third
party plaintiff thereupon proceeded by writ of error to the
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the order of a
trial court dismissing without prejudice a third party complaint
is not a final judgment from which writ of error can lie under
Rule 11. Again in Elwood Edwards, Inc., a Colorado corporation
and Elwood Edwards vs Hugo F. Sill,8 the court ruled that where
the real party in interest does not take a case to the Supreme
7 C.B.A. Ad. Sh. Vol. 7, No. 12, 1955.
SC.B.A. Ad. Sh. Vol. 7, No. 10, 1955.
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Court, nor is a party therein, appeal to the Supreme Court by Writ
of Error will not lie at the behest of a nominal party.
Although there has been but one decision in our Court within
the past year considering the general state of the record, still it
cannot be over emphasized that precision is needed in the perfecting of the Writ of Error and in the compilation of the record
upon which the Supreme Court will sit in judgment. Perhaps many
of us who know full well that the Trial Court having witnesses
before it, may many times reach judgments where we have committed errors in procedure and unfortunatelv let tbis hahit slin into
our practice in front of the Supreme Court. The thing which
counsel must keep in mind is that the Supreme Court passes judgment solely upon the record, occasionally supplemented by oral
argument, and that the record may appear vastly different from
the actual trial in the nisi prius court.
In the decision of Bernard E. Teets, et al, vs. Lee T. Richardson, individually, and doing business as Western Commission Company.9 The Court, through Mr. Justice Bradfield, in a short opinion
points out that the matter could be decided, "by dismissal of the
writ or error because of failure of compliance with the pertinent
rules of procedure, or upon the merits." The court points out, that
the record is defective in at least the following respects: "It contains only the pleadings filed by the parties, and the finding and
judgment of the Trial Court. There was no transcript and no exhibits attached thereto." The Court states, "that without a transcript of the evidence (in effect being unable therefore to construe
the exhibits as well) the presumption is that the judgment is supported by the evidence." This case well illustrates the fact that if
the record in complete detail is not before the Court the chance for
reversal is correspondingly lessened. One could almost say that it is
better to have a sloppy record, provided that it is complete, than
to have none at all, or one that is quite incomplete.
The next matter considered by our court, and one which has
formerly taken a considerable portion of its attention from time to
time, with respect to appellate procedure is that of original jurisdic9C.B.A. Ad. Sh. Vol.

7, No.

11, 1955.
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iton. There has been but one decision within the past year in this
field. Arthur J. Kemper vs. The District Court of the City and
County of Denver in the Second Judicial District, the Honorable
Joseph E. Cook, one of the Judges thereof, and Hazel I. Kemper,'0
In this decision, pursuant to Rule 116, the petitioner sought to
invoke the original jurisdiction of the Court in a divorce matter
in which an interloctuory decree had been entered by an unverified petition. The Court set aside the interloctuory decree and informed petitioner that he would have 15 days within which to
tender the record, or 15 days within which to answer. Petitioner
did neither, but rather went to the Supreme Court under Rule 116.
The Court points out, "the fact that a Court has erroniously granted
or denied a change of venue, or is otherwise proceeding without
or in excess of jurisdiction will not be regarded as sufficient to
invoxe Ruie 116," and states further, "that a Writ of Prohioicion is
not to be granted except in matters of great public importance."
The present one is not such a matter. The Court properly points
out that here petitioner could have proceeded in one of two fashions: Either by answer, or by tendering the record and proceeding
on Write of Error. He did neither and therefore suffered the result
above.
Within the past year there have been two cases considering
the question of the record in a criminal case before the Supreme
Court of this state. It should be noted at the outset that the Rules
of Civil Procedure do not appiy in criminal cases, and that it is
up to counsel representing a defendant in a criminal case to be
prepared pursuant to statute to represent his client in the proner
procedural fashion. In the first case the defendant was found guilty
of driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor. He was so
found by a jury empaneled in the County Court. His counsel appealed to the Supreme Court under Writ of Error. The Supreme
Court noted that there was no bill of exceptions; that in the motion for new trial the only grounds stated were, "that the complaint was erroneous and prejudicial, the testimony of a witness
was incompetent and the sentence was contrary to law." The Court
notes that pursuant to Vol. 1, 53, C. R. S. Page 120, there must be:
"°C.B.A. Ad. Sh. Vol. 7, No. 9, 1955.
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(1) Assignments of Error; (2) the record must contain objections
to evidence or other matters of which the defendant complains; (3)
the record must disclose exceptions to all adverse rulings with
which defendant complains (Page 157).
Again in the case of Pete Joe Narango, also known as Pedro
Jose Narango vs The People of the State of Colorado," the
Court points out that when a criminal case is tried in the County
Court, appeal does not lie to the District Court, but only lies to the
Supreme Court by Writ of Error.
These then are the cases which have been decided by our
Supreme Court within the past year covering the question of
Appellate Procedure. The Rules of Civil Procedure state the rules
ot Lne game and it is up to us as attorneys, if we are to do the best
job for our clients, to abide by same.
There have been but two cases decided in the Court within the
past year covering the field of agency. In the first of these, Olson
Manufacturing Company, an Idaho Corporation, vs. Charles Corsentuno, et at,'- we have a rather involved fact situation, but a basic
principal of law to determine the controversy. Here the defendant
manufacturing company attempted to sell beet harvesters throughSC.B.A. Ad. Sh. Vol. 7, No. 1, 1954
uC.B.A. Ad. Sh. Vol.

7, No. 7, 1955.
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out the northern part of Colorado. In particular, their attemnts
led them to stage a parade through the City of Brighton. At the
parade was some official of the Platte Valley Motor Company,
who became interested in the disposition of these harvesters.
Thereafter an agreement was entered into between the Olson
Company and the Platte Valley Company. Olson brought the machines to the Platte Valley, some from its plant and from the
territory involved. They were reconditioned by Olson at Platte
Vailey, and Platte Valley was to pay Olson for the machines only
if and when sold. Olson dictated and controlled the sales price and
fixed the amount of commission to be paid or retained by Platte
Valley at the time of sale. Olson made the arrangements for sale
and the method of sale, agreed to recondition the machines, specifically set out the method of remittance, to wit, by Platte Vailey
and further, in case of unsold machines, it arranged for their storage and reserved a right to dispose of them elsewhere. Olson also
consigned a store of parts to Platte Valley. (Page 224).
It appears that Platte Valley sold several of the machines,
but none of them worked. As a result this suit was instituted, not
only against Olson, but against Platte Valley. The Court states that
the soie question here is, "that of agency" (Page 223). The Court
analyzes these facts and concludes, "that this was a matter of consignment; that Platte Valley was the agent of the Olson Company,
acting within the scope of its employment. That therefore, the Olson Company was liable, whereas the agent was not."
An interesting decision coming under this heading is Tracy
Moore vs Joseph A. Skiles.1' This case should be of interest to all
attorneys who try tort cases involving automobile collisions. The
facts appeared to be as follows: The plaintiff and her husband were
driving back from a party which they had attended at Dotsero,
Colorado. While on a narrow shelf road at a blind curve they either
struck or were struck by the defendant. The plaintiff passenger
thereupon sued the defendant. The defendant answered, setting up
the defense of contributory negligence, unavoidable accident and the
11C.B.A. Ad. Sh. Vol. 7, No. 1, Pg. 5, 1954.
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Family Car Doctrine. Trial was to a jury and the jury left each
party where they found them. The Court states: "The primary
question is when a husband and wife are journeying together in
a vehicle jointly owned by both and engaged in a mission with a
purpose common to both, can the negligence of the husband in
operating the vehicle be imputed to the wiie" (Page 6). The Trial
Court had submitted the following instruction, "in this case if the
jury finds and believes from a preponderance of the evidence that
each driver was guilty of negligence which contributed to the
proximate cause of the accident and that the accident would not
have occurred but for the combined negligence of both drivers,
then the plaintiff cannot recover for the damages which she claims
to have suffered, and the defendant cannot recover tor the damages which he claims to have suffered" (Pg. 6). In a well reasoned
opinion, our Court adopts the principal of imputed negligence,
which is in effect, set out in that instruction. The Court points
out that where two parties, husband and wife, are engaged in a
common venture, where the right of control may be exercised
by either, then the negligence of a driver should be attributed to
the passenger. The Court points out that had this car stood in the
name of either husband or wife, the Doctrine of the Family Car
would have prevailed and the wife of plaintiff could not have recovered; that it recognizes that authorities are divided on the
question of imputed negligence with respect to the non-driving
passenger, but that in its opinion a common sense view requires
that the owner or joint owner riding as an occupant in his own
car, using .the car for a purpose in common with the driver, is
presumed to have a right to control the driver and a right to
manage and direct the movements of the car. "Where joint ownership of the car is shown, where joint occupancy and possession
of the vehicle is admitted and where the occupant owners of the
car use it on joint missions the driver will be presumed to be
driving for himself and as agent for the other present joint owner"
(Page 9).
Further, in a situation such as the present there is a presumption of imputed negligence; that is of joint control and management.
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It should perhaps, therefore, be noted so far as counsel who
may be trying this type case are concerned, that hereafter the
question of imputed negligence might be raised by affirmative
defense; where counsel can find from discovery procedures that
the car appears to be jointly owned or that there appears in one
manner or another to be joint control of the car; that the parties
are on a common enterprise. If these things are shown the presumption will arise and the burden will be upon plaintiff, to overcome it.
In conclusion, it can be said that not only as to agency but also
as to the field of procedure, there has probably been very little
new law written within the past year. Rather, there has been a
return, particularly with respect to appellate procedure, to the
rules as written with a requirement that there be a more strict
adherence to same upon the part of trial counsel. It behooves us
all, therefore, to know all the rules as well as the substance of the
law prior to the representation of any client on a given case.-M. R.
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